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What determines whether someone has a one-sided view of the world or perceives both the
negative and positive aspects of something? To understand the factors which determine the extent
to which human judgments are absolute we have to take into account studies of conscious and
non-conscious information processing (Reber, 1993; Underwood, 1996; Hassin et al., 2005), and
implicit and explicit emotions (Zajonc, 1980; Greenwald and Banaji, 1995; Ohme, 2007), which can
be interpreted as evaluative processes of different types (Reykowski, 1968; Oatley and Jenkins, 1996;
Sander and Scherer, 2009). Understanding human judgment requires a knowledge of psychology
and neurobiology (Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 1996, 2012; Sander et al., 2003; Sander and Scherer,
2009; Armony and Vuilleumier, 2013), both of which help to explain the conditions in which
individuals make extreme, absolute evaluations and the mechanisms which enable more complex,
moderate and nuanced appraisals.
We argue that models of judgment processes should refer to the dual mind theories (Epstein,
1990; Chaiken and Trope, 1999; Liberman, 2003; Deutsch and Strack, 2006; Kahneman, 2011),
and emphasize the distinction between affective (automatic) vs. intellectual (reflective) premises
of evaluative appraisals (Jarymowicz and Bar-Tal, 2006; Jarymowicz, 2009; Jarymowicz and Imbir,
2015).
AFFECTIVE VS. INTELLECTUAL EVALUATIONS
Affect can be viewed as a direct, automatic response to a stimulus which “by-passes the will”
(Gazzaniga, 2011) and influences cognition, evaluation, motivation and behavior (Zajonc, 1984;
Bargh and Chartrand, 1999; Cacioppo and Gardner, 1999; Pessoa, 2008). Primary affective states
(generated at subcortical level) are diffuse and lead to global, and often extreme, one-sided
appraisals (Plutchik, 1980; Zajonc, 1980; Cacioppo and Berntson, 1994).Moreover, these judgments
may be based on implicit, unacknowledged premises and associated with high subjective certainty
(Balas et al., 2012). Unfortunately, such unquestioned judgments become rigid and resistant to
change.
Intellect, the basis of deliberative thinking, enables individuals to reflect in more or less general
terms on reality, the past and the anticipated future, and to develop and use evaluative concepts,
including abstract concepts related to values (e.g., equality, justice, and humanism). Although such
moral concepts are so complex that they are never well-defined, reflective cognition can result in
the formation of moral standards, which are then used as points of reference for judgments about
reality (Reykowski, 1989; Krzemionka, 1993; Baumeister et al., 2007). As an individual develops
a capacity for deliberative thinking he or she acquires the ability to apply new types of evaluative
criteria and verbalize judgments based on these criteria; this gives rise to secondary affective states
(Zajonc, 1980; Rolls, 2000). Secondary affect does not dominate evaluative thinking processes. An
individual is able to perceive both negative and positive elements of a given object and consequently
his or her appraisal will be more nuanced, we will refer to such judgments as “heterogeneous” (e.g.,
one might be aware that out-group members have some negative as well as positive qualities).
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THE CONCEPT OF EVALUATIVE
HETEROGENEITY
We posit that the capacity for evaluations based on affect
is universal, whilst the capacity for evaluations based on
intellectual premises is less widespread. Judgments based on
affect are effortless, whereas evaluations based on intellectual
premises require conscious attention and deliberative thinking;
in other words they require the evaluator to invest time, energy
and cognitive capacity. It follows that there is considerable
individual variation in the relative proportions of affect-based
(automatic) and intellect-based (reflective) evaluations; we refer
to an individual’s disposition to base evaluations on intellectual
premises as his or her “level of evaluative heterogeneity”
(Jarymowicz, 2008, 2012). Evaluative heterogeneity is defined as
the ability to make nuanced appraisals which take into account
both the positive and negative attributes of an object.
Our studies were based on following assumptions: (A)
intellectual/reflective evaluative activity results in a tendency to
connect the evaluation process with a search for premises on
which to base evaluations; (B) this tendency reduces the influence
of irrelevant, affective stimuli on judgments; (C) this reduction
in the influence of affective factors applies to both explicit and
implicit evaluative processes.
Our hypothesis and empirical findings are described
below. We expected to find a correlation between evaluative
heterogeneity and resistance to the influence of irrelevant
affective factors. The studies considered two correlates: (1) the
independence of explicit appraisals on implicit affective priming
and (2) the limits of automatic in-group favoritism.
MEASUREMENT OF EVALUATIVE
HETEROGENEITY
Measurement of evaluative heterogeneity was based on the
assumption that this disposition will be reflected in an
individual’s spontaneous references to the negative as well as the
positive attributes of a given object. In this context “spontaneous”
means unprompted (e.g., by the experimenter); rather than
having respondents choose attributes from a check list we
required them to specify the attributes they associated with a
given object by answering an open question.
We decided to use objects that are usually evaluated positively
(to avoid overly strong interference from negative affect). In all
the studies mentioned below participants were asked to list “good
and bad aspects of patriotism” (patriotism is typically regarded as
a very positive quality in Poland).
The “Dilemmas and Discussions” technique (Karwowska
and Jarymowicz, 2003) involves presenting respondents with
an introduction which points out that some social attitudes
(e.g., to one’s country, to migration, abortion, children adoption
etc.) are controversial, and explains that “in this study we are
asking young people what they think about patriotism.” Then
respondents are presented with a table consisting of two columns
entitled “Positive aspects of patriotism” and “Negative aspects
of patriotism” and the instruction “Please list as many negative
and positive aspects of patriotic attitudes as possible.” Level of
evaluative heterogeneity is indexed as the proportion of a number
of negative attributes to a sum of all generated attributes.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
EVALUATIVE HETEROGENEITY AND
RESISTANCE TO THE INFLUENCE OF
SUBLIMINAL AFFECTIVE STIMULI
In series of studies we used divers versions of the subliminal
affective priming paradigm (Murphy and Zajonc, 1993). In the
classic version of the task participants are asked to give affective
evaluations of unfamiliar, neutral signs (Chinese ideograms)
using a scale ranging from “I like it” to :I don’t like it.”
All responses are primed by displaying a neutral or affective
subliminal stimulus for several milliseconds before the sign is
presented. The priming stimuli are photographs of human faces
showing neutral, positive (e.g., joyful) or negative (e.g., disgusted)
expressions. In version used by some other authors (Ohme, 2007)
participants are presented with Chinese ideograms which are
described as “symbols of human traits” and asked to make an
intuitive judgment as to whether a given ideogram represents a
positive or a negative trait. In our modification the participant
had to decide the extent to which a given ideogram represents
a trait characteristic of him or her (Błaszczak and Imbir, 2012).
All the data showed that implicit stimuli affect explicit judgments
and behavior; however in all the studies we observed inter-
individual variation in the extent of this influence (Jarymowicz,
2008; Karwowska and Kobylin´ska, 2014).
Karwowska (2001) introduced an important modification
to the affective priming impact index to distinguish between
participants who were more and less resistant to the influence
of priming. The modified index was based on the difference
between explicit appraisals made after negative or positive
priming (with faces expressing joy or disgust) and appraisals
made under control conditions (priming with a neutral face).
A small difference between appraisals made after affective and
neutral priming indicates that explicit appraisals are relatively
independent of the influence of affective priming.
In several studies level of evaluative heterogeneity was found
to be associated with the relative influence of affective priming,
i.e., in individuals with high evaluative heterogeneity there was
a relatively small difference between the explicit appraisals of
neutral objects made following affective and neutral priming
(Jarymowicz, 2008). These data are consistent with the results of
experimental studies in which we stimulated reflective evaluative
thinking and then provoked reactions to the subliminal affective
priming (Karwowska and Kobylin´ska, 2014). The data suggest
that the reflective system may inhibit automatic reactions (Imbir
and Jarymowicz, 2013).
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
EVALUATIVE HETEROGENEITY AND
BASELESS IN-GROUP FAVORITISM
In this section we discuss studies which suggest that evaluative
heterogeneity is related to the extent to which social judgments
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are based on prejudices. We define a prejudice (Jarymowicz and
Bar-Tal, 2006) as a pattern of direct, automatic affective reactions
to an object which influences information processing and can
lead to formation of rigid cognitive schemata, i.e., stereotypes.
Links between primary affective states and cognitive processes—
and hence links between prejudices and stereotypes—are usually
very stable. We postulate that changes in these associations may
be due to the development of reflective evaluative standards and
hence new approaches to social perception and evaluation of the
world (Jarymowicz and Imbir, 2015).
Several of our empirical studies investigated automatic in-
group favoritism and out-group discrimination (Jarymowicz,
2006, 2008). These studies were based on the assumption that
any sign of social belonging (including subliminal signs) can
generate diffuse affect and thus lead to simplified, absolute,
homogeneous evaluations. We expected that people with high
evaluative heterogeneity would be less vulnerable to this kind of
affective influence.
In our research on explicit attitudes we asked participants
for their opinions on diverse social objects, varying how direct
the method of assessing opinion was. In one study, for example,
participants were asked questions about the achievements of
Poland and various other non-European countries in several
domains where achievement is difficult to evaluate (such as
care for the elderly or provision for gifted children). Our
Polish participants viewed Poland as more successful than other
countries. In another study we asked questions about the rights of
ethnic and sexual minorities. A notable finding was that in all the
studies in-group favoritism and aversion to out-group members
were relatively low among participants with relatively high level
of evaluative heterogeneity (Jarymowicz, 2013).
FINAL COMMENT
Both the psychological and neurobiological data indicate
importance of the distinction between affective/automatic and
intellectual/reflective evaluative systems (Zajonc, 1980; LeDoux,
1996; Jarymowicz et al., 2013; Imbir et al., 2015, 2016; Jarymowicz
and Imbir, 2015). Like other dual mind theories (Epstein, 1990;
Deutsch and Strack, 2006; Kahneman, 2011), the concept of
dual evaluative systems can explain why an individual’s reactions
may vary across time and circumstances. But this concept
leads to question about possible interferences between the two
systems; one might ask under what conditions each system
dominates.
The explanations of the “heart” over “mind” domination
seem to be clear (Jarymowicz and Bar-Tal, 2006). We argue
(Jarymowicz and Szuster, 2014) that there is a high probability
that “mind” will dominate “heart,” but only in individuals who
have developed evaluative standards through reflective thinking.
In particular an individual has to connect standards based
on abstract concepts of good (e.g., humanitarianism) and evil
(e.g., violence) with concrete, real-life issues and applications
(e.g., equal rights; discrimination). Empirical correlative studies
showed that participants who are able to generate referents
of abstract evaluative concepts (like loyalty) tend to display
relatively little discrimination against out-groups (Jarymowicz,
2012).
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